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Abstract
The article discusses the role of observers in perception of flow of time. It compares two
established logics, Branching Space-times and Branching Continuations to a new logic
based on Barbour’s timeless approach to physics. The article shows that the
introduction of observer based valuation allows for the same evaluation of statements in
both temporal and atemporal logics. We show this on the evaluation of statements
about the future. Therefore we reach the conclusion that ontological time is not
necessary for the evaluation of temporal statements.
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A Copernican turn in temporal logics
Introduction
There is no time like the present. But what if every time is like the present? A
scientific hypothesis or even a theory that goes against our daily experiences has it
always difficult to convince people about its correctness. As a prominent example we
can look at Copernicus and his challenge to the geocentric system. While the geocentric
system accommodates our impression of the Sun’s movement, it can correctly predict
the positions of planets only if it uses a very complicated system of planetary paths. On
the other hand, the heliocentric system presents a simpler tool for the prediction of
planetary movements, nevertheless it forces us to challenge our daily perspective.
In a similar way we challenge our temporal perspective and the notion of flow of
time. As in the case of Copernicus, we take into account the position of the observer in
the universe. The view we partake to defend is that it is the specificity of observers and
their position in time that leads to the perception of flow and the uniqueness of the
present. The role of observers was often neglected and time was treated as a whole
instead of being judged from the perspective of different observers. Following the recent
contribution to the study of time by Dieks (2016), we attempt to present a formal
models for observer based temporal logics. We introduce a new logic based on
Barbour’s timeless physics and compare this with two established temporal logics,
namely Branching space-times and Branching continuations. We discuss the role of
observers in all of these systems and we investigate the truth and falsity of different
temporal statements. Comparing a temporal and atemporal model allows us to
demonstrate the weak Copernican principle in time - formally showing that the present,
and its observers, do not need to be in any specially favoured position in the universe.
Firstly we discuss the philosophical and terminological foundations of the work,
especially McTaggart’s time series, Belnap’s Branching space-time, and Barbour’s
timeless Platonia. Thereafter we introduce the formal tools and logics based on these
motivations and show how a timeless universe can seem to observers as containing time.
COPERNICAN TURN 4
Philosophical background
A philosophical origin of this work can be found in (McTaggart, 1908). McTaggart
distinguishes three different time series called A, B, and C-series respectively. The
A-series speaks about time as the ‘future’,‘present’ and ‘past’ and hence also
encompasses a privileged now and a dynamic flow of time. On the other hand, the
B-series uses only the terms ‘earlier than’ and ‘later than’, thus speaks only about
temporal relationship but not about any change. The last, C-series, is completely
atemporal view and describes only the non-oriented relationship between events.
McTaggart argues that if we want to explain time and our experience of it, we
need to look at the A-series. The C-series obviously does not describe our temporal
experience, neither does the B-series. He concludes, however, that because the A-series
is contradictory there cannot be any time itself. His argument against the A-series is
not the aim of our paper, so let us just mention that it is far from definitive and was
opposed by other authors. Nevertheless, the difference of the time series is a basic step
in identifying basic perspectives on time.
An older discussion on this topic was already present in Greek philosophy, where
we could say Parmenides defended that time is an illusion and Heraclitus argued for the
opposite. A contemporary wording of their argument might be that according to
Heraclitus “the world is made up of 3D objects, which endure and change in time, while
retaining their identity from one moment to the next. Parmenideans, on the other
hand, believe that the world is a changeless 4D spacetime continuum, containing
material objects that are 4D worm-like volumes extended along the time dimension.”
(McCall, 2006).
A recent philosophical revisit of this problem can be found in (Dieks, 2016). Dieks
argues for the B-series and concludes that "accounts of our experience of passage that
rely on a postulated objective flow of time have not shown that they are more than
abstract metaphysical exercises without a link to what science tells us about the world".
He also points to the similarity with colours as their perception is not merely an illusion
although there is no actual colour present. As Dieks sums it up: "In this sense our
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feeling of flow is veridical, in the same way as the perception of a colour can be faithful
to an actual state of affairs."
Yet, also physics seem to support a world without a flow. Firstly, as mentioned by
Dieks (2016), general relativity and physics in general show that "our intuition of being
in causal contact with a global Now is non-veridical". Secondly, we do not need time in
physics at all. Barbour (2000) presents physics that are completely timeless. Barbour
builds up the world from so called ‘configurations’ and connects them with a specific
measure. Although these configurations can be realized in multiple ways (for example
as relative configurations of particles in Euclidean space), they form the ‘primary
ontological elements’ for his theory. The measure then connects these configurations and
gives the world a C-series-like form. This approach, based on physics, therefore replaces
the classical linear idea of time with a multidimensional structure of possibilities.
These all, although well defended positions, represent non-formal approaches.
However, we have at our disposal formal temporal logics that would allow us to
formulate these positions in a formal way. Namely the branching temporal logic based
on Belnap’s work (Belnap, 1992) attempts to capture relativistic space-time. This
temporal logic uses a structure composed of causally ordered point-events. The higher
order building blocks of these structures can vary among approaches from so called
‘histories’ in the original Branching Space-times (Belnap, 1992) to the looser
‘continuations’ in Branching Continuations (Placek, 2011). These logics are viewed by
some as a possibility how to reconcile becoming with relativity (Pooley, 2013). We will
only mention that there exists a specific type of models that bring BST even closer to
physics, the so called Minkowski branching structures which are isomorphic with
Minkowski space-time (Müller, 2002)(Wroński & Placek, 2009). Therefore even a
demonstration closer to physics could be made.
The last notion that needs to be introduced is an observer. Notice that the
previous philosophical relied on the phenomenology of time and therefore the epistemic
state of the observer. Thus in order to formalize the arguments we also need to use a
similar observer. An observer is understood as a local collection of measuring devices.
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For simplicity we will assume that the observer is not fallible and has all the available
information at his disposal. This allows us to equate the observer’s knowledge with the
actual state that is physically accessible to the observer. The physical accessibility of
the state of the world is limited by the fact that the observer is a local collection of
measuring devices. An observer is therefore only a local collection of measuring devices
with a history of measurements or in other words with a history of states. In the
context of space-time our definition confines the observer to a time-like finite worldline
with all the events that can access this worldline via an at most light-like curve.
Branching Space-times with Observers
Let us sum up the basic ideas and definitions of Branching Space-times and
present the role of observers. Although Branching space-times (BST) were introduced
by Belnap (1992), we present the concise version from (Wroński & Placek, 2009).
Definition 1 (Wroński & Placek, 2009)
• The set OW called Our World , is composed of point-events e ordered by the
causal relation ≤.
• A set h ⊆ OW is upward-directed iff ∀e1, e2 ∈ h ∃e ∈ h such that e1 ≤ e and
e2 ≤ e.
• A set h is maximal with respect to the property of upward-directedness iff
∀g ∈ OW such that h ⊂ g, g is not upward-directed.
• A subset h of OW is a history iff it is a maximal upward-directed set.
• For histories h1 and h2, any maximal element in h1 ∩ h2 is called a choice point
for h1 and h2.
Hence a history is close to the idea of a possible course of events. What might
seem a little counter-intuitive is the scope of a history as it encompasses all the events
of a possible course of the world. Histories are made up from Each history hence
represents a different course of events in the universe. However, they are not separate
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ontological entities as histories are composed of point-events and those are the building
blocks of Our World.
Definition 2 (BST model, Wroński & Placek, 2009) 〈OW,≤〉 where OW is a
nonempty set and ≤ is a partial ordering on OW is a structure of BST iff it meets the
following requirements:
1. The ordering ≤ is dense.
2. ≤ has no maximal elements.
3. Every lower bounded chain1 in OW has an infimum in OW .
4. Every upper bounded chain in OW has a supremum in every history that contains
it.
5. (Prior choice principle) For any lower bounded chain O ⊂ h1 − h2 there exists a
point e ∈ OW such that e is maximal in h1 ∩ h2 and ∀e′ ∈ O(e < e′).
In order to investigate the truth of statements in a BST structures we should
introduce also a language. This language contains classical logical operators and the
usual Priorean operators F, P (‘it will be true’, ‘it was true’.) The ‘Sett :’ operator
denotes a settled option, i.e. true for all the branches. With these we can introduce the
valuation of formulae.
Definition 3 (Point satisfies formula - BST, Wroński & Placek, 2009) For the
model M = 〈OW,≤, v〉. Where v is the valuation v : Atoms→ P(OW ). For a given
1A chain is a totally ordered set.
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event e and history h, such that e ∈ h:
M, e, h  p iff e ∈ v(p)
M, e, h  ¬ϕ iff not M, e, h  ϕ
M, e, h  ϕ ∧ ψ iff M, e, h  ϕ and M, e, h  ψ
M, e, h  Fϕ iff there is e′ ∈ OW and e∗ ∈ h s.t.
e′ ≤ e∗ and M, e′, h  ϕ
M, e, h  Pϕ iff there is an e′ ∈ h s.t. e′ ≤ e and M, e′, h  ϕ
M, e, h  Sett : ϕ iff for all e′ ∈ h′, for all h′ such that e ∈ h′:
M, e′, h′  ϕ
Notice that the future operator could be rephrased as ‘at a future event to e,
namely e∗, we will be able to say that ϕ is true’. We cannot, however, just pick event e′
as it does not have to be necessarily in h and it might be that ϕ does not hold at e∗
(i.e. it is not a settled future).
This satisfaction definition is the classical version without an observer. We can,
however, add an observer to BST based on a few simple definitions and modify the
evaluation of formulae.
Definition 4 (Worldline)
A set Wl ⊆ OW is a worldline iff Wl is a chain. We denote Wl(e) a worldline
containing the point-event e.
Definition 5 (Observer in BST)
An observer O is a finite worldline Wl limited by two point-events ei and ef ,
where ei is the initial observation and ef is the final observation.
An observer of a point-event e ∈ OW , Oe, is an observer such that there is
e′ ∈ Oe such that e ≤ e′.
An observer hence can only observe point-events that have causally influenced his
worldline. Because an observer is basically a set of consistent point-events, he does
specify a set of histories that are consistent with each other up to the point of the last
observer’s point-event.
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Definition 6 (Observer valuation)
For given M, e and observer Oe and histories hi, such that Oe ⊂ hi, a formula ϕ
is true for Oe iff for every hi it holds that M, e, hi  ϕ.
Lemma 1 (Observer and histories) An observer O is part of at least two histories.
Proof. Follows from the definition of observer and history. Q.E.D.
Because of our approach, we take the observers worldline as the whole state of the
observer based on which we can judge upon the truth or falsity of statements. We can
thus state how a formula would be evaluated with respect to an observer.
Theorem 1 (Observer time asymmetry) For an observer O, there exists at least
one well formed formula about the future that cannot be attributed any truth value.
Proof. An observer is part of at least two histories based on Lemma 4. Because these
histories must coincide on the observer, they must diverge at some e such that ef ≤ e
and hence we can construct a formula that relies on the valuation at e that will have a
different truth value in h1 and h2 and hence cannot be true or false for the observer.
Q.E.D.
Branching Continuations with Observers
One of the original motives for Branching Continuations (BCont) in Placek (2011)
were general relativistic space-times because BST is not capable to capture general
relativistic structure. Problematic is the scale of histories and their
upward-directedness. However, we can introduce BCont with observers as in Švarny`
(2013). A noticeable difference at first sight between the two structures, a BST and a
Bcont one, is the locality of ’histories’ in BCont. This brings them closer to the
observer than in the case of BST histories as we have seen.
BCont also starts out with the set of point-events of Our World OW . However,
these points are related by paths, called snake-links. However, if we follow the basic
definitions from the mentioned articles, we do not need to make any alterations and
BCont can accommodate the same type of observers as we have seen in BST.2
2For further discussion on the relation of BCont and BST, see (Placek, 2011).
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Definition 7 (Snake-link, Placek, 2011)
The properties and basic definitions of snake-links:
1. 〈e1, e2, . . . , en, 〉 ⊆ W (1 ≤ n) is a snake-link iff
∀i : 0 < i < n→ (ei ≤ ei+1 ∨ ei+1 ≤ ei)
2. A snake-link is above (below) e ∈ W if every element of it is strictly above (below)
e.
3. Let W ′ ⊆ W and x, y ∈ W ′. x and y are snake-linked in W ′ iff there is a
snake-link 〈e1, e2, . . . , en, 〉 such that such that x = e1 and y = en and ei ∈ W ′ for
every 0 < i ≤ n.
4. For x, y ∈ W , x and y are snake-linked above e, x ≈e y, iff there is a snake-link
〈e1, e2, . . . , en, 〉 above e such that x = e1 and y = en.
The relation ≈e is reflexive, symmetrical and transitive, hence an equivalence
relation on the set We = {e′ ∈ W |e < e′}.
Definition 8 (Set of possible continuations, Placek, 2011) Set of possible
continuations of e, Πe, is the partition of We induced by the relation ≈e.
∀e < x : Πe 〈x〉 is the unique continuation of e to which the given x belongs.
Definition 9 (Placek, 2011)
∀e′, e, e0 ∈ W : ((e ≤ e′ ∨ e′ ≤ e) ∧ e0 < e ∧ e0 < e′ → ∃H ∈ Πe0e, e′ ∈ H)
Definition 10 (Set CE of choice events, Placek, 2011) For e ∈ W , e ∈ CE iff
card(Πe) > 1.
Definition 11 (Consistency, Placek, 2011) For e, e′ ∈ W , let there be
We := x ∈ W |∀c(c ∈ CE ∧ c < e→ c < x) and a similar for e′. Then e, e′ are
consistent iff they are snake-linked within We ∪We′. A set A ⊆ W is then consistent if
every two elements of A are and it is inconsistent iff it is not consistent.
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Definition 12 (L-events, Placek, 2011) A ⊆ W is an l-event iff A 6= ∅ and A is
consistent.
For the definition of a BCont model, the definition of a BST model is used, only
altered on places, where the snake-link has its influence. BCont is in many aspects a
generalised form of the BST models.
Definition 13 (Model of BCont, Placek, 2011) W = 〈W,≤〉 is a model of BCont
if it satisfies:
1. W is a non-empty partially ordered set;
2. the ordering ≤ is dense on W ;
3. W has no maximal elements;
4. every lower bounded chain C ⊆ W has an infimum;
5. if a chain C ⊆ W is upper bounded and C ≤ b, then there is a unique minimum in
{e ∈ W |C ≤ e ∧ e ≤ b};
6. for every x, y, e ∈ W , if e 6< x and e 6< y, then x and y are snake-linked in the
subset We 6≤ := {e′ ∈ W |e 6≤ e′} of W ;
7. if x, y ∈ W and W≤xy := {e ∈ W |e ≤ x ∧ e ≤ y} 6= ∅, then W≤xy has a maximal
element;
8. for every x1, x2 ∈ W , if ∀c : c ∈ CE → c 6< xi, then x1, x2 are snake-linked in the
subset W6>CE := {e ∈ W |∀c ∈ CEe 6> c} of W.
Further definitions enlighten, why are snake-links necessary. Because L-events are
not as large as histories, they need a way how to connect space-like related (SLR)
points. These are of interest in physics, as SLR events cannot directly influence each
other in a causal way.
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Definition 14 (Basic transitions in BCont, Placek, 2011) Let 〈W,≤〉 be a model
of BCont. A basic transition is a pair 〈e,H〉, where e ∈ W and H ∈ Πe is a
continuation of e.
Definition 15 (SLR, Placek, 2011) e, e′ ∈ W are SLR iff they are compatible but
incomparable.
Another physics related term is S-t locations, which stands for space-time
locations.
Definition 16 (S-t locations, Placek, 2011) We say that a model 〈W,≤〉 of BCont
has spatio-temporal locations iff there is a partition S of W such that
1. For each l-event A and each s ∈ S, the intersection A ∩ s contains at most one
element;
2. S respects the ordering ≤, that is, for all l-events A, B, and all s1, s2 ∈ S, if all
the intersections A ∩ s1, A ∩ s2, B ∩ s1 and B ∩ s2 are nonempty, and
A ∩ s1 = A ∩ s2, then B ∩ s1 = B ∩ s2;
3. similarly for the strict ordering;
4. if e1 ≤ e2 ≤ e3, then for every l-event A such that s (e1) ∩ A 6= ∅ and
s (e3) ∩ A 6= ∅, there is an l-event A′ such that A ⊆ A′ and s (e2) ∩ A 6= ∅, where
s (ei) stands for a (unique) s ∈ S such that ei ∈ s;
5. if L is a chain of choice events in 〈W,≤〉 upper bounded by e0 and such that
∃s ∈ S∀x ∈ L∃e ∈ W : (x < e ∧ s (e) = s), then ∃e ∗ (e∗ ∈ ⋂x∈L Πx (e0) = s).
S is then called a set of s-t locations for 〈W,≤〉.
Definition 17 (Ordering of s-t locations, Placek, 2011) For s1, s2 ∈ S, let
s1 - s2 iff ∃e1, e2 (e1 ∈ s1 ∧ e2 ∈ s2 ∧ e1 ≤ e2).
Lemma 2 (Placek, 2011) If 〈W,≤, S〉, a BCont model with a set S of s-t locations, is
downward directed, then - is a partial dense ordering on S.
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Lemma 3 (Placek, 2011) Let 〈W,≤, S〉 that is downward directed and satisfies the
following conditions:
• ∀e1, e2, e3 ∈ W (e1 ≤ e3 ∧ e2 ≤ e3 → e1 ≤ e2 ∨ e2 ≤ e1) surnamed “no backward
forks”
• ∀e, e′ ∈ W : if e, e′ are incomparable by ≤, then there are H1, H2 ∈ Πm such that
H1 6= H2, e ∈ H1 and e′ ∈ H2, where m is a maximal element of
W≤ee′ = {y ≤ e ∧ y ≤ e′};
Then S is linearly ordered by - and every l-event of 〈W,≤, S〉 is a chain.
For semantics of BCont a point-event and l-event pair is used in a similar way as
in BST. However, we use the definition from (Placek, 2011) used the original Branching
Time models of Prior Prior (1968) as a basis for BCont semantics.
Definition 18 (BT+Instants inspired model, Placek, 2011) A model 〈W,≤, S〉
is said to be (BT+Instants)-like if it satisfies the following conditions:
• downward directedness,
• no backward forks,
• ∀e, e′ ∈ W : if e, e′ are incomparable by ≤, then there are H1, H2 ∈ Πm such that
H1 6= H2, e ∈ H1 and e′ ∈ H2, where m is a maximal element of
W≤ee′ = {y|y ≤ e ∧ y ≤ e′};
This allows us to state the truth-conditions of metric tenses saying that the two
events are t units apart. Sentences will be then judged based on evaluation points, built
out of l-events and thus will be event/l-event pairs mentioned already earlier.
Definition 19 (Structure and model) A structure for the language L, as defined
before, is a pair G = 〈W , X〉, where W = 〈W,≤, S〉 is a (BT+Instants)-like model of
BCont such that |S| = |R|, and X is a real coordinalization of S.
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A pair M = 〈G, I〉 is a model for language L, where G is a structure for L and
I : Atoms→ P(W ) is an interpretation function and Atoms is the set of atomic
formulas of L.
Definition 20 (Evaluation points) Let G = 〈W , X〉 be a structure for language L,
where W = 〈W,≤, S〉. Then 〈e, A〉, written as e/A, is an evaluation point in G for
formulas of L iff {e} ∪ A ⊆ W and A 6= ∅.
Noteworthy is the fact that we do not require for a e/A that e ∈ A, also to be
mentioned is the fact that Placek (2011) suggests a plain ontological reading of the
meaning of e/A. Although it is also true that the BCont approach carries with itself less
tension between ontology and epistemology as l-events are more accessible than BST
histories.
This construction of evaluation points and coordinalization of X allows us to use
metric tense operators F(x) and P(x) with x ∈ R. For the language L, we assume that
its atomic formulas are present-tensed and that it has the two metric tense operators,
usual connectives (¬,∧,∨,→) and modal operators Sett(as “it is settled”), Poss(“it is
possible”) and an operator Now.
Definition 21 (Extensions of an evaluation point) Let G = 〈W , X〉 be a structure
for language L, W = 〈W,≤, S〉, and e/A be an evaluation point in G for L. Then:
• e/A goes at least x-units-above e (0 ≤ x) iff
∃e1 ∈ W∃e2 ∈ A(e1 ≤ e2 ∧ int(e, e1, x));
• e/A’ is an x-units-above-e extension of e/A (0 ≤ x) iff A ⊆ A′ ⊆ W and e/A’
goes at least x-units-above e.
Definition 22 (Fan of evaluation points) Let G = 〈W , X〉 be a structure for L,
W = 〈W,≤, S〉, and e/A be an evaluation point in G for L.
Two l-events A1 and A2 of W are isomorphic instant-wise iff
∀e1 ∈ A1∃e2 ∈ A2s(e1) = s(e2) and ∀e2 ∈ A2∃e1 ∈ A1s(e1) = s(e2)
e/A′ ∈ Fe/A, fan of evaluation points determined by evaluation point e/A iff e/A’
is an evaluation point in G and A and A’ are isomorphic instant-wise.
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In many cases this leads to a single possible A’, A itself. An important point is
that the evaluation of the formula depends on the moment of use, eC .
Definition 23 (Point fulfills formula) For given eC , e/A and the model
M = 〈G, I〉.Then:
1. if ψ ∈ Atoms:M, eC , e/A  ψ iff e ∈ I (φ);
2. if ψ is ¬ϕ : M, eC , e/A  ψ iff it is not the case that M, eC , e/A  ϕ;
3. for ∧,∨,→ also in the usual manner;
4. if ψ is Fxϕ for x > 0 : M, eC , e/A  ψ iff there are e′ ∈ W and e∗ ∈ A such that
e′ ≤ e∗ and int(e’, e, x), and M, eC , e′/A  ϕ;
5. if ψ is Pxϕ, x > 0 : M, eC , e/A  ψ iff there is e′ ∈ W such that e′ ∪ A ∈ l-events
and int(e’,e,x) and M, eC , e′/A  ϕ;
6. if ψ is Sett : ϕ : M, eC , e/A  ψ iff for every evaluation point e/A′ from fan Fe/A
and M, eC , e/A′  ϕ;
7. Poss : ψ := ¬Sett : ¬ψ;
8. if ψ is Now : ϕ : M, eC , e/A  ψ iff there is e′ ∈ s(eC) such that e′ ∪ A ∈ l-events
and M, eC , e/A′  ϕ.
Definition 24 (Definite truth) M, eC , e/A |= ψ, read as ψ is definitely true at
M, eC , e/A, iff there is an x ≥ 0 such that for every x-units-above e extension e/A′ of
e/A : M, eC , e/A′f ′  ψ;
M, eC , e/A |=Indef ψ, read as ψ is indefinitely true at M, eC , e/A, iff there is no
x ≥ 0 such that for every x-units-above e extension e/A′ of e/A: M, eC , e/A′  ψ or for
every x-units-above-e extension e/A′ of e/A: M, eC , e/A′  ¬ψ;
Theorem 2 For any formula ψ and any evaluation point e/A, exactly one of the
following three options must hold: e/A |= ψ or e/A |= ¬ψ or e/A?= ψ
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We don’t go into much more detail but let us list some of the properties from
bcont.
• if ψ is fulfilled at an evaluation point e, it can cease to be fulfilled at an extension
of this evaluation point;
• if ψ is definitely true at a evaluation point e, then it is definitely true in every
extension of e;
• if ψ is indefinite at a point, so is its negation;
• if ψ ∧ ϕ is indefinite at a point, ψ ∧ ϕ is either indefinite or definitely false at this
point;
• if ψ ∨ ϕ is indefinite at a point, ψ ∨ ϕ is either definitely true or indefinite at this
point;
• if ψ → ϕ is indefinite at a point, ψ → ϕ is either definitely true or indefinite at
this point;
• settled cannot be indefinite: Sett : ψ is definitely true or ¬Sett : ψ is definitely
true.
Also in our coordinalization, every sentence becomes definitely true or definitely
false at a sufficiently long extension of a initial evaluation point.
At this point we can use the same definitions of worldlines, observers and observer
related truth as in the case of BST. Although we speak of consistent l-events instead of
histories, the end result is the same and the Bcont variation of Theorem 3 holds.
Barbourian Temporal Logic
Although this is a quote of Mach, it represents the key idea for Barbour’s
approach:
It is utterly beyond our power to measure the changes of things by
time... time is an abstraction at which we arrive by means of the changes of
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things; made because we are not restricted to any one definite measure, all
being interconnected.
(Barbour, 2000)
As already mentioned, Barbour (2000) authors what he calls a "many instants
interpretation of quantum mechanics" a timeless model of the world where time is
merely an abstraction. For Barbour, the equivalent of Our World is called Platonia and
it is composed out of all the possible states of the world, sometimes referred to as the
‘heap of possibilities’. One such possible state is called a ‘configuration’3. For our
purpose we do not need to go into much detail about the quantum physical foundation
of Barbour’s theory. Let us just mention that the universe is represented by a
Wheeler-DeWitt equation, a universe wave function that captures all the possibilities.
Hence in Barbour’s view, each configuration is basically a three dimensional
snapshot of the universe that captures the relative configuration of matter and fields in
the universe. Platonia is then composed of all the possible configurations of such sort.
They have an intrinsic structure that contains all the physical evidence that leads us to
the impression that time passes. Barbour calls these objects ‘time capsules’. A time
capsule is therefore a part of the configuration that suggests in some way the direction
of time or works as evidence for the passage of time. Classical examples of time
capsules are geological sediments, camera films, or particle traces in a cloud chamber.
However, as we see, each configuration is static and timeless.
We notice right away the difference between a BST or BCont structure and
Platonia lies in the scale of their building blocks. While we had point-events at our
disposal in the previous cases, Barbour’s structure works with configurations. These
should have an intrinsic structure. However, for our purpose it is sufficient to take them
as basic members of Platonia.
Definition 25 (Platonia) We call P Platonia, the set of all configurations c.
3Sometimes configurations are refered to as instants. However, in order to purge any impression of
temporality we use the former term, their meaning in Barbour’s theory is the same.
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However, we assume a deeper structure in them, for example the already
mentioned time capsules. This depth can be in our current approach unified into one
operator ∆(c, c′), the difference in arrangements (i.e. relative distances, energies, etc.)
between two configurations4.
Definition 26 (Direct transition) Two configurations c, c′ ∈ P have a direct
transition c ≈d c′ iff ∀c′′ ∈ P : ∆(c, c′) ≤ ∆(c, c′′). There is a transition c ≈ c′ iff there is
a chain of direct transitions c1 ≈d c2 ≈d ... ≈d cn such that c1 = c and cn = c′.
Therefore if we would look at configurations of two points and have three possible
configurations based on only the one dimensional distance of the points: c1 one meter,
c2 two meters, and c3 three meters, then there is a direct transition between c1 and c2,
c2 and c3. However, there is not a direct transition between c1 and c3, because there
exists a configuration whose arrangement is closer to the one of c1, namely c2. There
still would be a transition between c1 and c3.
Definition 27 Two configurations c, c′ ∈ P are directly successive c < c′ iff c ≈d c′ and
c ∈ Ψ(c′). Where Ψ(c) denotes the set of possible preceding configurations based on time
capsules from c.
Definition 28 A Barbour history h is an direct succession of configurations c ∈ P.
Definition 29 A choice configuration cc is a configurations c ∈ P such that
∃c1, c2 ∈ P : c1 6= c2 and cc ∈ Ψ(c1) ∧ cc ∈ Ψ(c2).
Definition 30 Barbour Structure S
1. The ordering < is dense.
2. The relation < is transitive.
3. The relation < is antisymmetric.
4. The ordering < has no maximal elements.
4A possible interpretation of ∆ is the Kullback–Leibler divergence of configurations.
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5. Every lower bounded chain in P has an infimum in P.
6. Every upper bounded chain in P has a supremum in every history that contains it.
7. (PCP) For any lower bounded chain C ∈ h1 − h2 there exists a configuration
c ∈ P such that c is maximal in h1 ∩ h2 and ∀c′ ∈ C c < c′.
The two structures, Barbour’s and Belnap’s, stay the same at this point. However,
notice that in Barbour’s idea of configuration ordering there could be a maximal
element. A maximal element in this case can represent an ultimate arrangement of
matter that does not have any successor (some kind of black hole possibly). This would
be also the trivial example of a Barbour structure that is not BST.
We use the language L with atomic formulas (statements about configurations in
the present tense), tense operators F, P , modal operators Sett :, Poss : and connectives:
∧,∨,→,¬. The semantic model itself needs only the addition of an interpretation
I : Atom→ P (P). This interpretation is based on the time capsules of the
configurations and their arrangements.
Definition 31 For the model M =< S, I,>, a c from P satisfies a formula ψ in
language L iff:
• ψ ∈ Atom: M, c, h  ψ iff c ∈ I(ψ)
• ψ is ¬φ: M, c, h  ψ iff it is not the case that M, h  φ
• ψ is φ ∧ pi: M, c, h  ψ iff M, c, h  φ and M, c, h  pi
• ψ is φ ∨ pi: M, c, h  ψ iffM, c, h  φ orM, c, h  pi
• ψ is φ→ pi: M, c, h  ψ iff if M, c, h  φ then M, c, h  pi
• ψ is Fφ: M, c, h  ψ iff
∃c′ ∈ P : c << c′ and ∃h′ ⊂ P : c, c′ ∈ h′ and M, c′, h′  φ
• ψ is Pφ: M, c, h  ψ iff
∃c′ ∈ P : c′ << c and M, c′, h  φ
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• ψ is Sett : φ: M, c, h  ψ iff
∀h′ ⊂ P∀c′ ∈ P : if c ∈ h′ and (c′ < c or c < c′) then M, c′, h′  φ
• ψ is Poss : φ: M, c, h  ψ iff
M, c, h  ¬Sett : ¬φ
Similarly as in the previous cases, we can introduce an observer. BTL cannot
properly use the notion of a worldline. However, we can define the observer based on
the configurations that have the closest to his current configuration. Notice that any
(reasonable) configuration that contains an observer has also his history in the form of a
time-capsule. Hence we can say that we tie together the the configurations based on the
time-capsules available to the observer.
Definition 32 (Evidence)
A set E ⊆ P is called evidence iff E is a chain of configurations. We denote E(c)
an evidence containing the configuration c.
Evidence is available at configuration c iff the set E contains c as the maximal
member.
Note that we have definitely transitioned now from ontology to epistemics because
the evidence present at a configuration c is some physical evidence in the configuration,
however the chain of configurations that was created is just an abstraction based on ∆.
Also do not forget that we assumed our observers are infallible and have all the
accessible data available. This simplification, put into Platonia, would actually mean we
single out some specific configurations (namely the ones containing such observers) of
the plethora of possibilities.
Definition 33 (Observer in BTL)
An observer at configuration c, Oc is an observer that can use only the evidence
available to him at c.
Definition 34 (Observer valuation in BTL)
COPERNICAN TURN 21
For given M, c and observer Oc and evidences hi, such that E ⊆ hi, a formula ϕ
is true for Oe iff for every hi it holds that M, e, hi  ϕ.
Lemma 4 (Evidence and histories) An evidence E is part of at least two BTL
histories.
Proof. Follows from the definition of evidence and history in BTL. Q.E.D.
Theorem 3 (Observer time asymmetry in BTL) For an observer Oc, there exists
at least one well formed formula about the future that cannot be attributed any truth
value.
Proof. Similar as previously. Q.E.D.
Therefore we see that also observers in BTL are subject to the same time
asymmetry as observers in BST or BCont and could not, based on statements about the
future, differentiate between a temporal and a atemporal model.
Conclusion
We hope to have shown that in three different temporal logics an observer can be
introduced and although two of the temporal logics contain time in the form of
space-time and the third one is based on an atemporal universe, the evaluation of
formulae for an observer can be the same. A further investigation on precise formulae
that would allow to differentiate the structures should be now conducted in order to
strengthen or refute the view that these models are equivalent from the point of view of
an observer. As the Sun did not stop to rise in the east after people realized Earth is
not the centre of the universe, so change does not vanish with the realization that the
world might be timeless.
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